How to Build Consensus-less Blockchains




Alberto Sonnino



Byzantine Fault Tolerance








Byzantine Fault Tolerance








2. submit transaction

1. make transaction





2. submit transaction 1. make transaction







2. submit transaction 1. make transaction











Cross-Domain Discipline

Distributed Systems

- But not like a DB running in my datacenter
- Adversarial network and Byzantine adversaries

• Security

Both network and systems security

Programming Languages

- Execute the smart contract & ensure determinism
- Solidity, Move

Cryptography

- Nodes cannot use secrets to execute smart contracts
- Anonymous credentials, ZK-proofs

Network Security Challenge #1

Some node are not well-protected in datacenter; we can't rely on beefy machines

Network Security Challenge #2

Highly dynamic set of nodes



Safety

Undesirable things never happen

Security Properties

Liveness

Desirable things eventually happen

Adversary **#1** The Network: Worst possible schedule

Properties

- **Synchronous**: A message sent will be delivered • before a maximum (known) delay.
- **Asynchronous**: A message sent will eventually ulletbe delivered at an arbitrary time before a maximum (unknown) delay.
- **Partial Synchronous**: the network is • asynchronous but after some time it enters a period of synchrony.

Challenges

- Theoretical models: Need careful implementation to ensure we approximate them, e.g., retransmissions.
- Memory: Naive implementations use infinite buffers. Identify conditions after which retransmissions are not necessary and buffers can be freed.
- Asynchrony means the protocol should maintain properties for any re-ordering of message deliveries.
- Unknown delay means delay should be adaptive to ensure robustness.





Adversary **#2 Bad Nodes: Arbitrary behaviour**

Properties

- **Correct / honest / good:** Will remain live and follow the protocol as specified by the designers of the system.
- **Byzantine:** will deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. May respond incorrectly or not at all.

Challenges

- Crash & recover: this is still a correct node with very high latency. Need persistence to ensure this
- **Rational:** honest validators may have some discretion. They may use it to maximise profit



Network Security Challenge #3

Some nodes are bad, you may be talking with someone lying and trying to DoS you

Network Security Challenge #4

Bad nodes have access to all committee (insider) information

Ippical Architecture

P2P flood & Selection on fee

Sequence all transactions in blocks



Mempool / Initial Checks

Consensus

Overlay flooding slow and with significant redundancy

> Seconds latency, traditionally low throughput

Execute each transaction (global lock)

Update DB, indexes, crypto (Merkle trees)

(Sequencial) Execution

DB Update & High-**Integrity DS**

Single core does all computations. (eg EVM ~300 tps)

> Added latency of store, blocks, and crypto computations

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Consensus

(Sequencial) Execution DB Update & High-Integrity DS

Single core does all computations. (eg EVM ~300 tps)

> Added latency of store, blocks, and crypto computations

New Architecture Consensus is not required

Coins, balances, and transfers

NFTs creation and transfers

Inventory management for games / metaverse


Auditable 3rd party services not trusted for safety Game logic allowing users to combine assets

 $\bullet \bullet \bullet$

New Architecture Consensus is required

Increment a publiclyaccessible counter

Collaborative in-game assets



New Architecture The Sui System

Consensus only when you need to


New Architecture Architecture


Owned Objects


- Objects that can be mutated by a single entity
- e.g., My bank account
- Do not need consensus

Shared Objects

- Objects that can be mutated my multiple entities
- e.g., A global counter
- Need consensus







The Sui System Transactions

Objects:


- Unique ID
- Version number
- Ownership Information
- Type (shared, owned)


The Sui System Transactions

Objects:

- Unique ID
- Version number
- Ownership Information
- Type (shared, owned)

Transaction's content





transaction

Nodes check and sign T1



User gather >2/3 signatures into a certificate and disseminate it

Effect T1:

User gather >2/3 effect signatures for finality

Network Security Challenge #5

Different types of target links: clients-nodes and nodes-nodes

Example Transaction

T1

Inputs: 01, 02, 03

Output: Mutate O1, Transfer O2, Delete O3, Create O4

Example Transaction

T1

Inputs: 01, 02, 03


Output: Mutate O1, Transfer O2, Delete O3, Create O4

e.g., Mutate a coin to pay for gas

e.g., Delete a disease caught by my warrior

e.g., Transfer my NFT magic warrior to friend

e.g., Be rewarded with a mystery gift



Step 1: Owned object locks & version exist at validator



L1 = (O1, 10)Sender=X : None



L2 = (O2, 27)

Sender=X : None



L3 = (O3, 1001)Sender=X : None

We call these "locks", and are initialised to None.

Step 2: Validator V checks / signs transactions



L1 = (O1, 10)Sender=X : None T1



L2 = (O2, 27)

Sender=X : None T1



L3 = (O3, 1001)Sender=X : None T1

Move call details

Signature of X

Transaction: T1


Inputs: (01, 10), (02, 27), (O3, 1001)

Checks T1 (Validity)

- Well-formed (syntactic)
- Valid Signature from X
- Valid execution function
- Version owned by X

Checks T1 (Broadcast)

• Object-version exist Lock was set to None



certificate and disseminate it

Step 3: Validator V process certificate



L1 = (O1, 10)Sender=X : None T1



L2 = (O2, 27)

Sender=X : None T1



L3 = (O3, 1001)Sender=X : None T1

Transaction: T1

- Inputs: (01, 10), (02, 27), (O3, 1001)
- Move call details
- Signature of X
- Signature (V1, ... V4)


Checks T1 (Validity)

• Again!

Checks T1 (Broadcast)

- Objects exist (with any lock)
- Certificate signed by quorum

Step 4: Validator V executes / signs effect




Transaction: T1


- Inputs: (O1, 10), (O2, 27), (O3, 1001)
- Move call details
- Signature of X
- Signature (V1, ... V4)

Execute T1

- O1 mutated
- O2 transferred
- O3 deleted
- O4 created



finality



disseminate it


User gather >2/3 effect signatures for

Example Transaction

T2

Inputs: 01, S2

Output: Mutate O1, Mutate S2, Create O4



Step 1: Shared object locks exist at validator



L1 = (O1, 10)Sender=X : None



L2 = (S2, *)

Sender=X

Do not check the version for shared objects

Step 2: Validator V checks / signs transactions



L1 = (O1, 10) Sender=X : None T2



L2 = (S2, *)

Sender=X

Transaction: T2

Inputs: (O1, 10), (S2, *)

Move call details


Signature of X

Checks T2 (Validity)

- Well-formed (syntactic)
- Valid Signature from X
- Valid execution function
- Version owned by X

Checks T2 (Broadcast)

- Object-version exist
- Lock is set to None



Step 3: After consensus, assign shared objects locks



L1 = (O1, 10)Sender=X : None T2



L2 = (S2, 4)

Sender=X

Transaction: T2

- Inputs: (O1, 10), (S2, *)
- Move call details
- Signature of X

Assign Shared Locks

- Every node sees the same sequence out of consensus
- So they can all assign the same shared object locks

Step 3: Validator V process certificate



L1 = (O1, 10) Sender=X : None T2



L2 = (S2, 4)

Sender=X

Transaction: T2

Inputs: (O1, 10), (S2, *)

Move call details

Signature of X

Checks T2 (Validity)


• Again!

Checks T2 (Broadcast)

- Objects exist (with any lock)
- Certificate signed by quorum



Step 4: Validator V Applies / Signs Effect




Transaction: T2

- Inputs: (01, 10), (S2, *)
- Move call details
- Signature of X


Execute T2

- O1 mutated
- O2 mutated
- O4 created






User gather >2/3 effect signatures for




No single entity to assign version numbers: the nodes need to choose it



If consensus is under DoS, all shared objects transactions are stalled

Network Security Challenge #7




If any blue link is under DoS, the protocol stalls (because we won't have a quorum)

The Sui System Transaction Execution


- First, execute all precedent transactions
- Once there is a certificate, any validator can download Tx and execute

The Sui System Transaction Execution

Owned-objects



Always executed in parallel (once they inputs ID/version are known)



Often executed in parallel

(Sequentially for each shared object)

Conclusion

The Sui System

- Separate owned and shared objects
- Only use consensus when you need to
- Execute in parallel whenever you can

- Paper: https://sui.io

• **Code:** https://github.com/mystenlabs/sui

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